John Polkinghorne's, "exploring Reality" commentary on his views of science and religion

mitchellmckain · January 6, 2008

In several forums I have been informed that the ideas I were expressing were very similar to the popular writings of John Polkinghorne on the intertwining of science and religion. When I learned that he is a quantum physicist who became an Anglican priest, the similarity that people could see made a great deal of sense, since I too have spent a great deal of my time in the study of both physics and religion with a masters in physics at university and another masters from seminary. Well I finally found a book he wrote and set out to see what he has written in order to see what I think of it. In my commentary on this book I shall use the abrieviatiton JP for the author.

Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion

JP defines "critical realism" as the belief in a reality that is more than a naive objectivity because it is infered indirectly rather than experienced directly. He claims that all scientists are critical realists whether consciously or not, because they experience for themself the feeling in science that they are studying something out there and are engaged in the effort to explain that something subject to admitted limitations. JP defends this critical realism and explains why scientists believe it by describing the highly surprising and even stubborn ways that the physical world tells us the way things are in defiance of both our common sense and our imagination. In other words, it is very clear that no one could possibly have imagined what physics is telling us about the nature of reality.

The second chapter of the book entitled, "The Causal Nexus of the World", is heavy reading even for the physicist, and it is quite clear that JP has been involved in research in the area of quatum physics because he introduces many details of this research that a mere masters degree in physics is unlikely make one familiar with. The general theme of the chapter concerns the question of which of these three points of view might be the case,

1. strong reductionism: Things are made of component parts and these components are all that exist.

emergence: When you have more than a single component part, properties and behaviors emerge that cannot be seen in the parts alone.

2. weak emergence: More is different, but there are no causes beyond a cumulative effect of the properties of the parts themselves.

3. strong emergence: New causal principles become active in the complex interactions between component parts.

He mentions in passing that he is what he calls an incompatibilist, which is someone who believes that true human liberty cannot be reconciled with total physical determinism by constituent parts. In this we most certainly agree, so I guess that makes me an incompatabilist as well. He mentions this to explain his forthcoming endeaver to discover whether there is in the discoveries of physics any justification for strong emergence which he believe is required by the incompatabilist's understanding of human free will. JP explains that the justification is primarily to be found in the fact that science give no seamless web of basic causality, and my concerns at this point and in what follows is twofold. First is the rather startling failure to mention the experiments that demonstrate that Bell's inequality fails (proving that Hidden variable theory is false). The second concern is that regardless of whether new causal principles emerge, somehow at least the possibility of such an emergence must be represented in the nature of the component parts, but this second concern is one that JP eventually acknowledges.

JP tells us that although quantum theory deals in probabilities, it is not necessarily indeterministic because probabilities can arise due to ignorance of all the relevant details rather than because it is intrinsically indeterministic. He admits that the great majority of physicists follow Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen interpretation that the probabilities arise from intrinsic indeterminism, but then JP introduces "hidden variable theory" incorrectly attributing this to David Bohm, when the truth is that this is a much earlier idea of Albert Einstein himself. Frankly, David Bohm is merely a representative of a fringe group of physicists, who following in the footsteps of Albert Einstein, continue to seek a means to resurrect physical determinism in spite all of the evidence to the contrary. In fact, the failure of JP to even mention Bell's inequality and the details that he reveals about his understanding of quantum physics all suggest that JP was probably involved in research by such fringe physicists. But the interesting thing is that these details also reveal that these efforts have continued to meet with failure.

It is perhaps part of the problem that Bohr and many other followers of the Copenhagen interpretation, as mentioned by JP, adopted the philosophical postion of logical postivism, which claimed in opposition to realism, that quantum physics was not to be understood as describing anything real but but only represented a way of summing up the results of experimental proceedures. The logical positivists thus set out upon an ambitious project (called "Unified Science") to reduce human language to empirical observation alone, but difficulties quickly brought the effort to a halt and convincing criticism of this whole philosphical outlook (e.g. by Karl Popper) began to grow, as it quickly became apparent that this was not even a sufficient foundation for language even in the hard sciences. Nevertheless it had the widespread effect of making the study of reality (metaphysics) an unpopular activity for academic philosophers, particularly as a result of such works as Rudolf Carnap's, "The Elimination Of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language", which convinced many that language is the only meaningful subject for philosophy to examine. As a result the ideas of logical positivism remains influential in what has become the philosophy of language.

After criticizing the logical postivist outlook, JP examines the connection between quantum physics and the classical physics that preceeded it, using for example the mathematical device of taking the limit as Plank's constant approaches zero. JP observes however that despite some success, the result is largely singular, meaning that many expression blow up and formula become nonsensical. This is not really all that surprising because the classical view of particles as point objects is singular and logically implies the existence of infinite forces and energies which are a bit unrealistic. Even in quantum physics the struggle with singularities continues requiring a complex mathematical proceedure called renormalization to overcome.

Anyway I shall continue this discussion of JP's book and this most difficult of chapters next time with a look at what JP calls one of the "great unsolved mysteries" of science, the measurement problem, which is really at the heart of all the difficulties and controversies in quantum physics.

Edited February 8, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · January 11, 2008

In order to understand the measurement problem in Quantum physics, you must first understand superposition and so JP explains this first. The objects in quantum physics, particles like electrons and photons, besides the unchanging attributes like mass and spin, also have changeable measurable qualities like position, velocity and the axis of their spin which are collectively called their "state". But unlike classical physics these state quantities do not always have definite values but can have probabilistic distribution of values - even what JP calls immiscible or contradictory values like being in two different places at the same time. This is what we call a superposition - being in a state that combines different values by assigning each different value a probability. Furthermore there are very clear experiements that demonstrate that a particle in such a superposition really must be thought of having all the values in the superposition at the same time.However, a measurement of that superpostion quantity of the particle gives only one value, but by looking at many measurements of particles in this same state we find that the whole collection of different measurements match the calculated probilities to very great accuracy. The problem is that we can only calcuate the probabilites but never the actual result in the measurement of a particular particle. This is the measurement problem and how to explain this is one of the great controversies of quantum physics. JP gives this list of six possible explanations:1. The majority interpretation and the one I believe is particularly helpful, called the Neo-Copenhagen idea, is that the irreversible behavior of large complex systems of many particles is what causes a measurement to select a particular value. This makes a great deal of sense because any measurement of such a superposition quantity must necessarily involve an interaction with an enormous number particles in order to produce something that we can see.2. The intervention of human consciousness through the involvement of a conscious observer causes this to happen. This possibility however produces absurdities like Schrodinger's cat which is both alive and dead at the same time, therefore very few physicist take this possibility seriously. Most believe that you just cannot have superpositions involving large groups of particles, whether anyone is looking or not.3. We can only calculate the probabilities because there are hidden variables which we have no knowledge of. However based on this idea, John Stewart Bell calculated an inequality that must hold between the correlations of different measurements if this is true. Experiments demonstrated that the inequality does not hold and so hidden variables cannot explain this problem within the accepted premises of the physics worldview. The key premise involved is local causality which restricts the propagation of causal effects to less than the speed of light, which is far too basic to modern physics for the majority of physicists to take suggestion of abandoning it seriously. However, some like David Bohm stubbornly continue to pursue (unsuccessfully) a "non-local" hidden variable theory which I believe must be considered to be outside the established physics worldview. 4. Quantum physics is really only describing statistical ensembles of large numbers of particles. The problem with this is that this just avoids the question of what determines the results of measurements and the usual case for statitistical physics is that there are unknown variables, which just brings us back to number 3.5. Some undiscovered physics is responsible for this. Physicists are always hopeful of finding new physics that will shed new light on this but of course this idea of new physics is really no explanation at all, particularly if it is not in the nature of hidden variables then we cannot imagine what it might be.6. Everett's many world interpretation (which I beleive is the second most popular view): The superposition really does grow to encompass any number of particles including a superpostion of observers each measuring something different, so that all the possible measurements actually happen but we experience only one of them. This interpretation has the advantage of completely preserving mathematical continuity and determinism. The problem is that it throws the physical worldview out the window with a proliferating multiverse where an uncountable new universes come into existence every instant. However I think this interpretation has great merit and the absurdity can be eliminated with a metaphysical consideration of the meaning of possibility. I believe that the answer to the measurement problem lies within a combination of the first and the last. The first supplies a nuts and bolts explanation of how and why the superposition collapses, while I think the mathematics of Everett's interpretation simply implies that a determinist view of world can only be maintained if it embraces a superposition of possible futures, and that this is equivalent to concluding that the world is not one of deterministic processes but one in which very real possibilities branch from every present moment.JP's conclusion, however is simply that, "an important joint in the causal nexist of the physical world remains problematic and controversial". In other words, JP simply sees the situation as support for his claim that science gives no seamless web of basic causality - i.e. that there are gaping holes in the effort of science to explain the causes of things.When I continue this review we shall look a JP's examination of the emergence of the new science of "chaos" and how this inter-relates with quantum physics.

Edited January 11, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · January 18, 2008

JP now explains that Laplacian determinism (that a demon of unlimited computing power and knowledge of the present could predict the whole future), was already significantly challenged in classical mechanics by Poincare because of the existence of unstable situations sensitive to the most minute detail. Even a simple a system of three bodies under mutual Newtonian gravitation displays such characteristics. This later blossomed into a whole new science of chaos when computer simulations of the weather displayed the same kind of sensitivity. JP now considers the possibility of "fusing quantum and classical characteristics, a process by which the consequences of the widely supposed indeterminacy of quantum phenomena might be amplified through chaotic dependence upon small detail to produce a widespread causal openness also in macroscopic phenomena." He goes on to list difficulties in this idea, but the problem is that it is rather unclear what it is that he sees difficulties in. First of all, it is unclear what he means by "fusing quantum and classical charactersistics". Certainly I think it is foolish to hope that that classical chaos can explain quantum indeterminacy. As for the connection between the two this is already apparent in the (neo-)Copenhagen interpretation in which irreversibility of macroscopic systems is seen as forcing a collapse of the wave function. But the failure of Bell's inequality demostrates that this does not extend to actually determining the result of the collapse and the logical conclusion is therefore that some causality must flow in the opposite direction whereby the actual result of the wave collapse plays a causal role in the determination of macroscopic events. Secondly, it is unclear what JP means by "widespread causal openness also in macroscopic phenomena". Certainly there is no reason to think that macroscopic phenomena are not deterministic for the most part, for it is only in special process where instabilities can result in the kind of amplification that will make the failure of causal closure in the measurement problem significant to macroscopic phenomena. But I think his hint or implication that the inherent amplification in such processes never makes the result of a quantum wave collapse significant to macroscopic events is plainly unreasonable, because this is exactly what happens in every measurement of a quantum superposition - amplifying the result of a quantum wave collapse to something large enough for the scientist to observe. In fact, I think it is only reasonable to see this amplification as part of the same irreversible process that induces the wave collapse in the first place.The reasons that JP gives for his rather ambiguous thesis are three. First there is an incompatability between a theory with intrinsic scale like quantum mechanics and one that does not like chaotic dynamics. Second is that there is the mismatch between how the time dependence plays a role in the two theories. Third is the differing properties of the geometric structures generated by the two theories in phase space. These are all mathematical difficulties and as such they all point to an inability to reduce quantum indeterminacy to a feature of macroscopic instabilities. In other words, these all sound like reasons why another attempt to explain away quantum indeterminacy and restore physical determinism has failed. This is in fact, what a merging of the two theories into a "quantum chaology" sounds like to me and therefore I quite agree with the impossiblity of such a merging.JP then raises the example of Hyperion, a moon of saturn tumbling chaotically in its orbit, to show how an effect of quanum physics is actually suppressed by macroscopic chaos. But it is frankly difficult to understand what JP thinks this proves. A quantum calculation suggests that the chaotic behavior of Hyperion should only last 37 years, but the chaotic tumbling continues because of continuing environmental disturbances in an effect which he calls decoherence. It is abundandly obvious, not only that the vast majority of quantum indeterminacy has no effect on macroscopic events but that nonlinear processes must dampen out the vast majority of perturbations. The sensitivity of nonlinear processes in chaotic dynamics can ONLY occur because they are HIGHLY SELECTIVE - in other words they can only be highly sensitive to some details and perturbations by being very insensitive to the vast majority of details and perturbations. To put it another way (crudely), the butterfly effect, whereby the motion of a single butterfly causes a storm on the other side of the planet can ONLY occur if all the other butterflies are ignored - because otherwise the motion of all these butterflies would cancel each other out.In conclusion, it is certain that the macroscopic reality which we inhabit does not behave according the rules of quantum mechanics so it is expected that decoherence suppresses quantum effects. And yet the quantum measurement as an interaction between quantum states and macroscopic events is an obvious counterexample and so we know that such counterexamples definitely exist. It is unreasonable to think that such interactions only occur in the physics laboratory. In the next installment, I will look a JP's consideration of irreversibility in macroscopic processes and may very well be able to conclude my examination of this difficult chapter of his book.

Edited January 21, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · February 4, 2008

JP next addresses the puzzle of irreversibility or the "arrow of time". The puzzle here is that the fundamental laws of physics are reversible or symmetric with respect to time. The is not an apparent symmetry but a fundamental one connected to the law of conservatition of energy. So the puzzle is why perceive that time has a direction, sharply distinguishing the past from the future. Well, JP begins to unravel this puzzle, at once with his very description of this irreversibility as, "the emergence in the behavior of complex systems of a definite direction for the arrow of time". As in any discussion of this puzzle, JP is led immediately to the one law of physics that does distinguish a direction of time and that is the second law of thermodynamics, that the entropy of an isolated system will tend to increase over time and will NEVER decrease.

To the non-scientist, the only explanation of entropy is some kind of measure of disorder, and JP gives the example of a broken glass, but this second law of thermodynamics is about probabilities and the perceved distinction we make between equally probable states. Taking the glass for example, we distinguish one of the possible arrangement of all pieces of the glass as special - the unbroken glass, while the vast majority of ways the pieces can be arranged all seem pretty much the same - a jumble of broken glass. To take another example, consider twenty pennies on the table and noticing which are heads up and which tails, some results seems special like all heads HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH and all tails TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT (which we tend to call ordered), while results like THHTTHTHTHTHHTHTHHHH and THTTHTTHTHHTHHTHTTHT all seem pretty much the same (and which we tend to call disordered or random). If we toss the 20 coins randomly all four of these results are equally likely but those two we call ordered are just two possiblilities while these other two are just two among about 2,432,902,008,000,000,000 others which we would also call random. This means that the probabilities are astronomical against getting either of those two special "ordered" results as opposed to one of these far more numerous results that we call disordered. As JP explains, "disorder (broken glass) wins out over order (a perfect goblet) because there are overwhelmingly more ways of being disorderly than of being orderly."

JP says that many believe there is a connection with the quantum problem of measurement, and I am one of them. JP describes this aptly as the idea that the irreversibility of macroscopic systems elicits specific results in a quantum measurement. However when JP suggest that this provides a striking example of the flow of causal influence from the large to the small, I think he is glossing over another important aspect of this, and that is how the quantum wave collapse also plays a role in macroscopic irreversibility. JP rightly points out that, "ChaosTheory" is something of a misnomer, because one of things it reveals is how simple dissipative systems can be the source of complex order, that may be best described as a "creative emergence of novelty", particularly in a special class of systems far from equillibrium due to the continuing interchange of enegy and entropy with a surrounding environment, because in such systems you can have a decrease of entropy at the expense of a much greater increase of entropy in the environment. This JP points out is all distinctively characteristic of living organisms.

It is JP's expectation that a general theory to cover the behavior of complex systems like this, will be force to recognize the inadequacy of the reductionist account, while seeing information as a fundamental quantity like energy. He supports his expectation with the example of the non-local behavior of the EPR effect where the quantum states of two particles can remain entangled even when separated by great distances. But what JP fails to mention is that this does not count as a counterexample to local causality because of the intrinsically random nature of the quantum measurement. As a result this is much like the relativity of simultaneity in that this really only effects our reflection upon events that are already past. His expectation that information will become a fundamental quantity like energy might be a reflection of recent developments such as Hawking's recent resolution of the information paradox regarding the Hawking radiation of black holes. I cannot say that I share JP's expectation in this regard.

JP acknowledges that the Copenhagen interpretation, that probabilistic nature of quantum phenomena is intrinsic, allows the metaphysician to see causes for macroscopic physical beyond the reductionist physical theory to mathematical laws that govern the particles of which we are composed. In this JP and I certainly agree, but it is upon the nature of these causes that we disagree. JP apparently looks to a non-local but what most people would consider a purely physical source for these causes, whereas I look to a completely non-physical source. This difference is connected to very different metaphysical conceptions of reality. We can both call our views a form of dual-aspect monism seeing the apparent dualities of such things as the mental and the material as deriving from different aspects of a single "world-stuff". But it is rather apparent that while JP sees only a single dualism between energy and information accounting for all the apparent dualities such as that between mind and body, I see three independent dualities, between substance and form, between mind and body, and between physical and spiritual. This will become more clear when we see how this plays a role in JP's rejection of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, for it seems that JP does not see a spiritual aspect to the human reality apart from the physical. I find JP's metaphysics overly simplistic and therefore much less able to account for the complexities of physical and spiritual truths, and far less capable of resolving the difficulties between science and religion.

Next time I shall move on to the third chapter called "Human Nature" which are basically JP's views on the theory of evolution and how this is integrated into his Christian world view. Where again we will see both great similarities in our viewpoints as well as enormous differences.

mitchellmckain · February 18, 2008

Chapter 3: Human Nature

In this chapter, JP immediately reveals the seriousness with which he takes the theory of evolution as a valid and important scientific discovery, and even suggests that this should be the basis for a transformation of thinking in theology as well from creation ex nihilo to a creation continua. "Unfolding evolution simply expresses the divine intention for the way in which creation is to realize its God given potentialities." However, I do not think JP brings to full realization the the potentiality in evolution to envision God's work of creation in a way that is more compatible with the modern Christian conception of God's work with man as a continuing relationship. Otherwise he might see that evolution rather than being an automatic process which God has "decreed" or instigated, is actually simply a objective description of God's creation of living things through relationship. However, JP is spot on when he says, "the contingencies present in the process represent the Creator's gift to creatures of the freedom to make themselves." I think this idea of self-creation is necessarily opposed to the whole idea of design, but JP does not make this clear at all. All that is required to complete the integration of evolution with the Christian worldview (with design excluded) is to realize that this is only half of the process, for living things do not develop autonomously in a vacuum but are radically open to influence from their environment and thus ammenable to the work of the farmer, shepherd and teacher in their interactive creative efforts by means of pruning, culling and education. This is the role of God as a creator of living things rather than as a designer of dead objects.

One critical question that need answering in order to find the place of JP more firmly in the spectrum of Christian thought on this issue, is whether he believes in an historical Adam and Eve. On one part of his website http://forums.xisto.com/no_longer_exists/, there is the comment, "It seems pretty clear from the Bible that Adam and Eve were the first truly morally conscious hominids but that there were other males and females around (eg Gen 4:14) from whom Cain's wife and the wives of the descendants of Adam would have come. This suggest that JP has an historical view of Adam and Eve, but this is not actually a statement made by JP himself. Furthermore no explanation is made how, as only two members of a biological species, the actions of Adam and Eve can have such a serious impact on the rest of mankind. JP's own words on this site include, "Adam and Eve represent symbolically, in my view, our hominid ancestors in which these remarkable capabilities first dawned." This suggests a less than historical view of these two Biblical characters.

Some of the problems with JP's lack of a belief in a spiritual aspect to reality apart from form is found in the following statement on his website, "That was the Fall, and its continuting consequence, generation after generation, conveyed culturally and perhaps partly genetically, is what we rightly call original sin. Its consequences are clear enough - something is slanted in human nature, both individually and socially, which corrupts good intentions and frustrates hopes. Christ came to restore our relationship to God and so to redeem us from original sin." I think this association of man's sinful nature with genetics is really tragic, lending itself to racist interpretations of the scriptures and looking for the causes and nature of sin and evil in all the wrong places - i.e. material causes. Shall we follow the ideas of Scientology in seeking to purge corruption from our bodies by physical means?

In answer to the most important question of reconcilation of evolutionary science and Christianity, in regards to the nature of man, JP can only point out the various ways in which human beings are unique: self conscious in a radically new way, posession of language, great range of rational skills, great creative powers, religious beings, and flawed moral beings. Thus JP leaves us with the basic Darwinist conclusion that we are simply the most clever and powerful of the animals, for ultimately our identity is to be found in our fully biological bodies. According to JP, the human soul is nothing more than the information bearing pattern of the body. It is not that our mental reality is denied but JP makes it clear that the mind is to be found in a "psychosomatic unity".

By contrast my own view claims that there is not only a separate spiritual dimension to reality but that the identity of human beings is to be primarily found in the mind as an individual living (physical yet not biological) organism apart from the body, which is nevertheless dependent upon its environment (the body) as are all living things. This gives mankind a fundamental separation of from the animals and can truly see Adam and Eve as historical first ancestors with both a physical heritage via their biological species and a mental heritage derived directly from a parentage of God. But perhaps what is most important, we can see that the origin and transmission of sin is one that has nothing to do with the body or genetics but to do with the ideas of the mind and the character of the human spirit (as a product of the choices we make).

However, one of the interesting things is that with our different approaches JP and I still come to some of the same conclusions. First is that the spirit/soul is not something unique to human beings but is something which we have in common with all living things, although the human spirit/soul can be distinguished by its "many layered complexity." The second conclusion that we share is that the spirit/soul of man is not a static thing obtained at birth but is rather a dynamic entity which grows and develops in the process of life. JP is actually more willing than I am to consider that the human spirit/soul might have a unchanging component given by God, for I consider the human spirit/soul to be entirely a product of the living process and of our own individual choices made in life. Where JP and I completely part company however is in his conclusion that the human spirit/soul is a mortal one and that our hope for immortality depends entirely upon God's intentions to restore us to existence post mortem in the resurrection of our bodies.

JP and I thus represent two extreme ends of the spectrum in Christianity with regards to the (natural) immortality of the soul.

There are a number of theological difficulties with JP's postion which I will discuss before I complete my commentary on this chapter of JP's book in my next installment.

Edited July 5, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · March 1, 2008

One of the biggest difficulties with the denial of the immortality of the soul and making eternal life dependent upon God resurrecting us, as JP does, has to do with the Christian belief in hell as a possible consequence of the choices we make. This would suggest that God resurrects those who reject Him or the suicide who has no desire for life against their will in order to add insult to injury by torturing them in a place like hell. One wonders why a God of love cannot just leave well enough alone. Now it is not difficult to dismiss the whole idea of hell, especially as an eternal punishment, as a ridiculous form of intellectual blackmail used by the evangelist to coerce belief. Thus it is not all that difficult to understand why JP has apparently taken a somewhat universalist direction in his ideas. However, one of the fundamental motivations in believing anything spiritual is the conviction that our actions and choices must have consequences which cannot be avoided and therefore univeralism tends to contradict this. Furthermore, my observation of human existence tends to suport the idea that not only do people make choices that have consequences that cannot be undone, but also that people often display a perversity of character that they will torment themselves to no purpose as addictive behavior which they are unwilling to let go of. The lessons of life even suggest that running away from your problems as the suicide does is something that cannot succeed. Therefore although I reject the idea of hell as an eternal punishment I judge that it is all too likely that our choices can have eternal consequences for which hell is an apt description.A second fundamental motivation in believing in anything spiritual is a feeling that there must be a reality beyond the physical where what we are is more than just a coincidental conjuction of particles following mathematical laws. And this is a motivation which is directly contradicted by and unfulfilled by JP's metaphysics of the soul being nothing more than the form of the body. Therefore I feel that JP's metaphysics is an unreasonable concession to materialism and an excessive simplification of the reality of human existence and thus I think that a more complex metaphysics recognizing the reality of a spiritual aspect of existence apart from the physical provides for a much richer understanding of the religious traditions of Christianity.JP's criticism of orthodox Darwinist thinking that tries to understand humanity "solely in physical biological terms and only in terms of differential reproductive success" as a "theory of everything" or as a comprehensive epistemology, is well said. JP's criticism should, however, not be construed as suggesting that the theory of evolution is not a valid scientific theory, for I don't think he intends it as such at all. JP's point here is simply the criticism that must be made of any ideological attempt to force fit all of life and reality into one explanation.JP's substantial contribution to this topic is best found in his ideas about our mental capabilities and language expanding our environment from the natural physical one to include the mental landscape of mathematics, science and the arts. He suggests that this greater environment introduces another force in human development which he calls "satisfaction" to compete with that of mere survival. Thus it is his idea that human development is not ruled by the principle of natural selection alone but also a uniquely human principle which we could call "self fulfillment". Furthermore, to aid in the transmission of this new sort of development to later generations, JP points out that language, both spoken and written improves upon genetics with the Lamarkian ability to pass on acquired mental achievements.However, from here JP goes on to suggest that this mental landscape being there for us to explore including the fact that understanding nature is accessible to our scientific inquiry, points to the "unifying will of a creator". He suggest that the very fact that human life engages us in scientific inquiry, in moral discourse and in the appreciation beauty, all point to the character of a Creator with a mind, a will for goodness, a joy in creation. I would point out that this is fine as long as its innate subjectivity is recognized. But I think JP fails to do this when he makes the claim that theology can properly be considered a "theory of everything". I would argue that it is highly questionable to consider an explanation which answers small questions or mysteries with an even bigger question and mystery, to a proper explanation at all. For this reason I don't find a belief in God to be properly motivated by any need for an explanation of anything. I just don't see that God explains anything and in fact must frankly judge that the idea of God raises some rather difficult questions in its own right.What JP suggests is explained by the existence of God is several things. One is a rather prevalent human experience of a need for the divine or an encounter with the divine. The second is as an explanation of the human predicament caused by refusing to acknowledge our "creaturely dependence". Both of these, however, must be considered highly subjective, both in the idea that an explanation is needed and in the idea that the existence of God succeeds in explaining anything. JP mentions criticism by feminist theologians and Nietche that there is in this idea a justification for the submission to dominance. I would certainly share this criticism as well, delaring as Albert Camus does in "The Myth of Sisyphus" that we can be quite satisfied in defying such a demand for submission no matter what the consequences may be. Therefore I find that I can only believe in a God who rather than demanding our obedience instead inspires our love by His own perfectly self-less love. I think that JP's conclusion is not so far from this when he explains that this is all part of a balance between the Christian ideas of grace and free will, and how service to a God of love can actually be the key to perfect freedom.Since that finishes up the Chapter on Human Nature, next time I will be moving on to chapter 4 entitled "The Historical Jesus".

Edited April 26, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · April 1, 2008

Chapter 4 The Historical JesusThis chapter is all about the significance of Jesus as a historical figure. The general theme of the whole chapter is that it is miraculous that we would even have heard of this man from 2000 years ago, who wrote no book and was abandoned by his followers when he was executed like a common criminal. This chapter is thus an investigation into the possibilities as to why this might be so. JP's comparison to John the Bapist, whom he says is only known because of his association with Jesus, is JP's first mistake. There is a religion of Gnostic origins called Mandaeanism (with 60,000-70,000 members worldwide), who considers John the Baptist to be God's best messenger, but considers Jesus to be a false prophet. Furthermore the whole idea that there is something here that requires explanation is questionable. As someone who wrote nothing but is remembered, Jesus is comparable to Socrates, who is known because Plato wrote about him. Is not the fact that he is written about in a popular book sufficient explanation of this (regardless of whether what is written about him even true)?Perhaps this is why a case is made in both cases that either or both of Socrates and Jesus may actually be an invention of the writers, but never actually existed. I personally don't think this is very credible in the case of Jesus however, the narratives about Jesus are too much like eye witness accounts of a poorly understood person to credit an idea of him being a fictional character. JP evaluates a list of corroborating evidence, but of course it is the gospel accounts that are the most significant. JP admits that these gospel accounts have the character of interpreted history, without the details requisite for a proper historical account. JP evaluates the differences between the gospel of John and the other three, noting descrepancies where John may have altered the facts, but also points out parts of the narrative that have a ring of truth because they are difficult to see what the authors could be.JP discusses the inescapable circularity that comes from the fact that theory (beliefs) are involved in the interpretation of the evidence. He uses his familiarity with this problem in science to bring to bear the means by which such a circularity is judged to be either "viscious" or benign. Science makes this judgement based on long term fruitfulness, meaning that those theories which have no utility in the further investigation of natural phenomena will eventually be discarded. For theology, JP explains the use of a criterion called "double disimilarity", which means no similarity to Judaism or the early Christian church. In other words, if it does not come from Judaism (and the Old Testament) and it is not something the early church would have been motivated to say, then having no other motivation, that is something that most likely reported because Jesus was heard to say it and for no other reason. I don't think JP point here is that we should not trust anything that does not satisfy these criterion but simply that the presence of portions do testify to an historical Jesus. JP points out that the view that Jesus was opposed by the Jews because He taught love and forgiveness and opposed the legalism of the Pharisees, is an untenable one because the Pharisaical traditions not only taught these same things but also tolerated considerable diversity. The most likely cause of opposition was not the content of his teaching but his methodolgy - namely the way he relied upon his own understanding and authority. Jesus was not against the law, but He did make it clear that following Him was more important. That Jesus scandalized people by eating with unsavory characters also has the ring of truth to it. JP points out that that the most common activity of Jesus reported in the gospels is the healing of the sick, and that the most common topic of his words was the "kingdom of God". This "kingdom" seemed to refer both to something now and in a future associated with the "Son of Man". JP spends some time evaluating the meaning of this term, "Son of Man". The significance of this term is tied to one of the more obvious differences between the gospel of John and the other three. John makes a rather clear declaration of the deity of Jesus while the other three Gospels are far less clear on this, especially because in these three gospels, Jesus refers to himself as the "Son of Man", the very difficulty of this term points to authenticity. JP however points out that in Aramaic this term is a rather natural one and quite often a reference to the speaker himself. But JP suggest that this is a title that Jesus has for Himself to refer to His role in God's plans and that this very claim to have such a role is also a likely cause for the opposition of the Jews. But more than anything it was the cleansing of the temple, which JP calls an "enacted parable of judgement", that the Jews would have seen as a criminal disruption of the established order.JP ends by returning to the main theme of this chapter of why it is that Jesus is even remembered at all, but considering the claims and accounts of Jesus' resurrection. He thinks the alteration in the behavior of the disciples points to the fact that something significant must have happened. An evaluation of the accounts reveal something that contradicts the possibility that these orignate in fabrication. For if they were fabricated by a single person then they would be consistent but if they were fabricated by many then there is one strange similarity in all the accounts that makes this hard to credit. This is the fact that in most of these accounts Jesus is initally difficult to recognize. JP also considers the prominant role of women in the first encounters to be significant evidence of authenticity as well.JP suggests that if we believe this claim of resurrection then this, at least, would point to a significance of Jesus which would explain why He has such a status in our attention. It further it explains why He would be so quickly elevated to the status of a deity among his followers. This introduces the topic of JP's next chapter, the Trinity, for this JP claims is a direct consequence of the belief in the divinity of Jesus.

mitchellmckain · April 9, 2008

Chapter 5 Divine Reality: The TrinityJP notes that Quantum Physics made us realize that the universe is stranger than we ever imagined, to the point where classical logic required the revisions which are the foundations of quantum logic. JP notes that physics itself has had to accept some unresolved issues of consistency. First there is the two great theories of modern physics, General Relativity and Quantum physics, which could not be reconciled to each other. The second example that JP gives is the measurement problem in quantum physics itself. This has produced a situation in which the physicist can no longer expect in his work to apply a judgement of whether a proposition is reasonable. The universe has defied our expectations. The scientist has to be content with what the evidence suggests. JP raises the example of the conclusion that light behaves both like a wave and a particle even though it is not reasonable that both should be true. JP claims that quantum field theory resolved this difficulty to bring to light a new kind of rationality. Well quantum field theory does indeed resolves the contradiction mathematically, but to say that this completely resolves the difficulty is a rather premature when the measurement problem remains right at the heart of it.JP calls the thinking which proceeds from the evidence (observation of particulars) to the formulation of theory, "bottom-up thinking" as opposed to "top-down thinking" which proceeds from general rational principles to deduce the nature of particulars. JP proposes that this idea of "bottom-up thinking" has application in theology, particularly in those aspects of Christian thought like the Trinity which defy common sense. JP suggests that the example of science indicates that when theology investigates the nature of the divine reality, it must be careful not to fall into the trap of restricting oneself to reasonable expectations. Instead JP suggests that theology must aim for the same kind of delicate balance that is found in science between the look for a coherent explanation and not neglecting the possibility that new forms of rationality may only come to light by the revelation of actual experience. JP points out that we must not neglect the fact that theology rests upon its own kind of "objective" evidence, written revelation, which supports the idea that the truth in these matters, like that in physics will defy our rational expectations. So JP suggest that if the quantum world requires its own form of logic, so might also a description of the divine reality. JP then explains how the resurrection whose historicity he defended in the last chapter gives rise to the belief in the divinity of Christ, which is clearly the strongest motivation for the doctrine of the Trinity.. The "bottom up thinking" which justifies the doctrine of the Trinity is found accounts of events of profound relationship between the different persons of God and in the continuing experience of Christians. JP gives the example of, Jurgen Moltmann's view of how the cross transforms our view of God from that of only spectator looking down on us. Taking upon Himself the human condition to suffer as we have suffered is only a part of it, for it is only made complete by events in the relationship between the persons of the Trinity. The grief of the Father for the death of His Son is seen in the darkening sky. The anguish of the Son in being forsaken by the Father is seen in His cry of, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" JP points out that this view leaves no room for modalism, for such significant events of relationship require God to be different persons at the same time.The apparently marginal role played by the Holy Spirit in that event gives us cause to consider other events. There is the Father resurrecting the Son and the pouring out of the Spitit. There is the baptism of Jesus which gives a definite simultaneous role for all three. And these two events have played a role in setting the pattern of thought for Christian practice. Worship and prayer is filled with and empowered the Spirit, addressing to and giving thanks to the Father, while in the name of and in union with our Lord Jesus. The most difficult task in understanding the Trinity is in the idea that this does not contradict the unity of God, which is three persons but one God. But like quantum physics we find that it actually brings a new and better rationality to exceed our expectations and limited experience. It forces us to question why we should think that an infinite God would be limited to a single person? And in exceeding the limits of singular personhood, this reality of God pulls us out of our own excessive self-involvement. It transforms many traditional concepts like the sovereignty and glory of God from the realm of the tyrannical because it no longer implies self-absorbtion but rather a shared love, and ideals which are not just abstractions but perfectly practiced. We can say that the truth which God instructs us in, is not mere known by God, but actually proved in the unity of God. A God which transcends the individuality of different persons in perfect unity shows us how we can also transcend our seperateness to become more than ourselves alone.JP discusses the theological concept of "appropriation" whereby what one person of the Trinity does, must nevertheless be thought of as an act of God as a whole. For example, the death of Christ on the cross is seen as a great act of God reconciling the world to Himself. We can see this in Jesus' rather firm assertion that when we see Him we see the Father, and thus it is through His character and actions that the Father is revealed to us. JP explains by this principle, that even if we primarily see the Father as creating, the Son as redeeming and Spirit as sanctifying, this is never exclusive, so we also see all three involved in creation, redemption and santification. JP suggests that these internal relationships in the Trinity play a role in allowing God to create freely but not arbitrarily, meaning that it is not demanded by an unfulfilled need but a product of pure generosity and a selfless desire to give from an abundance of love.

mitchellmckain · April 26, 2008

Chapter 6: The Nature of TimeJP lays out the problem by referencing two positions of ancient Greek philosophy, Parmenides and Heraclitus. In Parmenides view our experience of time is an illusion for there time is only a dimension in a four dimensional reality with past, present and future all in existence. This JP refers to as the block universe and which I would characterize as treating the universe as a four dimensional object. Heraclitus saw the universe as a continuously unfolding process of becoming, in which the future does not exist to be known. Into this picture, special relativity offers insight but not resolution. The Pamenidean view may argue that the relativity of simultaneity indicates that time differences and the order of events are insubstantial and thus past, present and future must be thought of as equally real. But the Heraclitian view can point out that the relativity of simultaneity is invariably an issue of ordering past events in retrospect. I would add to this that all that SR really changes is the Euclidean independent of time and space, so that instead of a NOW which is the everywhere at one time, we must talk only about a HERE-NOW and a localization of this time unfolding process.JP next considers the objection which has been made that science has not incorporated any representation of the now. But in addition to the defenses which JP makes I must add my own dispute of the veracity of this claim. JP observes that there is a preferred inertial frame in the one that is at rest respect to the cosmic background microwave radiation. But his main argument is that this failure of science to capture this basic human experience only points to the limitations of science. These defenses are fine but I think the claim is not even correct. In SR there is a very clear representation of the now as part of an absolute separation between the future and the past is made. Furthermore there are the clear recognitions of irreversibilities and the collapse of the wave function in quantum measurements which makes the same absolute division between past and future.At this point JP declares that there is one common confusion that must be avoided and that between the issues of temporality and determinism. One is an issue of causality and the other how we view time. I think this is slightly naive however, for between these two views of time that JP has presented I would present another view in which past present and future are all laid out but that the future is not entirely one of actual event but which includes a superposition of possible events. In this view the issues of time and causality are tied together to some degree because these superpostions of possibility are a direct consequence of the lack of determinism in the unfolding of these events because of those situations where quantum wave collapse does affect the course of future events. Therefore I would suggest that while this view of atemporality incorporates the lack of determinism the view of atemporality where such possibilities do not exist may indeed be considered to contradict the lack of determinism.Next JP considers the theological implications of these two views of time, which is found in the Creator's relationship to creation. That God apprehends the world atemporally has been the understanding of classical theology. But the view suggested by scripture is one of a temporal unfolding in one of God's changing relationship to the people of Israel and then further changes in relationship to Christians in their time. At the very least this suggests that embracing both of these, we must accept that there are both atemporal and temporal poles within God. But I would point out that atemporal view necessarily restricts God to the role of observer only, whereas the temporal view has God involved as a participant in the unfolding of events. In any case, JP claims that this goes hand in had with the view of "current omniscience" (knowing all that is knowable now) as opposed to absolute omniscience (knowing all that will ever be knowable). There is no contradiction with divine perfection, if God in the decision to create a temporal world where He would be a participant in events made a kenotic self-limitation by his own choice, not to know a future that does not actually exist in a state with all its details resolved.JP now addresses the effect that this view of time has upon how God is revealed and how scripture is to be understood. The atemporal pole of God may be accessible in timeless moments of illumination or union with God as the mystics of the Eastern orthodox suggest is possible. But scripture reveals the temporal pole of God by means of narrative and an unfolding story and this points to an error in the treatment of scripture as a collection of absolute truths. What we have instead is a God who changes his relationship to us in order to be the instigator of our continuing development. This suggests a principle of continuing revelation by the Spirit of God in the Christian community as it continues to explore the meaning of the scriptures, and it is by this process that the doctrine of the Trinity came into being in the fourth century and which eighteen centuries later led to a complete rejection of the practice of slavery.JP points out that one of the great advantages of this temporal view of God is that this is reaffirmed rather than contradicted by the modern developments of science in understanding the evolution of the universe and terrestrial life. So the question arises as to why there continues to be resistance to this idea, where there is a distrust of time and desire for ultimate atemporal stability. I cannot help but believe that it is derived from an addiction to a delusion of certainty and an immature demand for absolute and final answers, which confuses faith with willfulness. JP's reason for rejecting this tendency is only that it is opposed to our fundamentally temporal nature. Yet JP also cautions against evolutionary optimism, which must be seen an illusion because physics makes it quite clear that the inevitable destiny of the universe is one of dissolution. For this reason, JP says that we can only find optimism in the promise of God in an eschatological future. JP vision of that future includes an embodiment (resurrection) in a different kind of matter in a temporal life which we are engaged in a never-ending exploration of the inexhaustible life and energies of God. This of course differs from my view based on the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul that finds hope not in an eschatological future but in an otherworldly (but at least personally temporal) existence for which this world is only a preparation.

mitchellmckain · June 15, 2008

Chapter 7 The Spirit and the FaithsNowhere is the similarity between the views of JP and myself greater than in what is expressed in this chapter. Here JP addresses the what he calls "the problem of diversity". For JP this is a problem because after defending the spiritual authenticity of Christianity, he now confronts the reality that the spiritual authenticity of other religions cannot be rationally dismissed without it rebounding on Christianity as well. So JP acknowledges the evident stability, integrity and sincerity to be found in competely different relgious traditions. They all point to a instinct for the divine in human nature but do so from contradictory conceptions of reality.JP points out how this diversity of religion must be particularly disturbing to the religious person trained in the sciences because of the obvious contrast with the universality of understanding to be found in science. JP does not explore this as much as he should, at least not in this particular book (he does allude to a more in depth look at this question that he has made in other books). But I think we must be forced by this contrast to one of two conclusions. Either there is no reality out there shaping the conclusions of religion like there is in science, or the nature of what relgion concerns itself with is of a vastly different character than that which science studies. In previous chapters, JP has already raise some tentative reasons for rejecting the first of these alternatives and that the kind of bottom up reasoning that led to the the rather unexpected doctrine of the trinity. Indeed this doctrine of the trinity challenges our rationality much in the same way that wave-particle duality (for one example) does in physics.In any case, JP is quite firm in his assertion both of a rejection of the idea that religion is just culturally shaped opinions and of the seriousness of the challenge represented by diverse claims made about the nature of reality in religion. One of JP's more interesting suggestions is that science can be a bridge between religions, if they engage in sharing their insights into how they understand modern science to relate to their theology. This, of course, presumes that religions accept the validity and effectiveness of scientific inquiry. This they can do without accepting proposition that what science describes is the sum total of reality. However science obviously cannot be such a bridge if its neutrality and integrity is compromised by forcing a theological bias upon its investigations as is being attempted in the promotion of Intellegent Design as science. Therefore the key to any reconciliation of science and religion must be a clear understanding of the boundaries of science and religion. Religions pretty much define themselves but the definition of science is found in a particular methodology which necessarily restricts its subject matter to that which is measurable or observable in an objective manner.JP is very careful to explain that objective of dialog between religion for which science can be a bridge, is not one of compromise and a reduction of religion to some kind of "lowest common denominator". For it seems rather clear that the many of the clashing specifics of religion are also what give each of them much of their living power. In Christianity, for example, the divinity of Jesus lies right at the heart of its understanding of the power that is being offered for the transformation of human life. This includes a conviction that Jesus is the only way, because it is our efforts which destroy us. But clearly this is also the source of a cognitive clash with other faiths.JP mentions Rahner's concept of the "anonymous Christian" which points out that the saving power of Christianity cannot depend on such superficial things as the names that are used, for this would be like saying that the Bible is only true in only one language and that only those who speak that language can be reconciled to God. JP suggests that this idea that some people might really be Christians without knowing it, seems a little patronizing. But I think this is only because it is expressed in Christian terms, and especially because of the mistaken presumption of equivalence between salvation and being Christian.JP suggest that the answer is found in the activity of the Holy Spirit, by which, for example, medieval theologians explained how non-Christian thinkers like Plato could have contributed so much to the philosophical foundations of Christian thought. Implicit in this idea that in the Holy Spirit God works with all people of all cultures for His providential purpose of salvation for all. Thus JP raises the example of the Petacost as a reversal of Babel, whereby the Holy Spirit acts as a bridge between languages and cultures. However I think we can go far beyond this by contemplating the Protestant formula for salvation, which affirms that it is by the power of God alone that we can be reconciled to Him. I believe that when this concept is applied unilaterally and without limit all the dissonance between faiths vanishes, for it says that what saves is not Chrisitan beliefs, but the work of God alone. But then it is only God who can say what is His work and the clash between religion may only be between the limited ways in which we can see His work. Even saying that Jesus is the only way, can be seen in the light of the divinity of Jesus as just another statement that it is by His work alone that we are reconciled to God. In fact, I believe that the evidence indicates that rather than being a problem, diversity is an answer -- diversity is how God works both in the natural world and in man. Thus this diversity of human thought (and religious faith) is actually a beautiful creation of God that is essential for the savation of mankind.

mitchellmckain · July 9, 2008

Chapter eight: EvilFirst JP makes the observation that physicists seem to be more likely to embrace some kind of religious thinking than are those in the biological sciences even if it is the kind of cosmic spirituality of Einstein, as if the perceived order of the universe brings to mind the language of God. By contrast, biologists are embroiled in a controversy with the religious over evolution, and biology affords many examples that make the idea of design in living things a little absurd. Living things a filled with examples of both the most awe inspiring efficient complexity and the most tragic mistakes. But in addition to this, JP suggests that the biological scientists seems to be stuck in the same kind of over inflated confidence in the ability of a mechanistic worldview to explain everything that physicists had before the advent of quantum physics. Because of this JP thinks that biological sciences will eventually confront similar worldview transforming discoveries, where the science forces them recognize the role of emergent causal principles in the biological organism.However in this chapter it is the awareness of tragedy that JP is most interested in because it underlines the greatest philosophical obstacle to religion, known as the problem of evil. This is the apparent contradiction between the power and character attributed to God and the existence of evil and suffering. In addition to the natural evils of which biologists are particularly aware there is also moral evil which is a consequence of human choices. I very much agree with JP when he points out that this is an existential problem as much as a logical one, for actual experience of evil and suffering can be a far weightier matter than any mere logical or philosophical consideration. And yet I will add the observation that JP does not that such experiences seem to be as much of a faith maker as a faith breaker, probably because it is often only faith that gives people the power to endure such experiences. Doctors are quite aware of the critical importance that a will to live has in the ability of the patient to survive, and perhaps this is one of the reasons that of all those in the biological sciences doctors are most religious. The point is that belief matters, for surviving the most difficult things requires a belief that it is worth it and it is this that seems to have a fundamental tie with a belief in a good and loving God more than anything else.JP discusses what he sees as the three most significant answers that theologians make to this. First the oldest is according the literal understanding of Genesis and Romans 5:12, that death and suffering are the result of the disobedience of mankind's first ancestors. JP says that science has made this answer untenable and I certainly agree that this interpretation is the least compatible with the scientific worldview. JP suggest however that Genesis can be understood as a symbolic turning away from God in dawning hominid consciousness and an emerging awareness of death, but I find this to be a rather insipid approach that all but makes God Himself completely symbolic of some development in the hominid mind. Furthermore I find the attempt to interpret Romans 5:12 as meaning that only an awareness of death is the result of sin to be too great a distortion of scripture.First there is nothing in the theory of evolution that requires making the story of Adam and Eve completely symbolic. There is a much much more natural approach, and that is to see Adam and Eve as the first hominids with an awareness of God, because He in fact communicated with them directly. The Bible has a tradition of calling those to whom God has chosen to communicate, the children of God or "sons of God", and this lends itself to a rather straightforward interpretation of Genesis 6 as an answer to the age old question of whom did the sons of Adam and Eve marry: the "sons of God" married the "daughters of men" and their children were men of renown. But if this is the case, then what of evil and suffering and what of Romans 5:12? Well Biblical support for it is not enormous but there are suggestions that there is another kind of death than physical death.Probably the biggest hint, which punches a rather large hole in literal minded interpretations of Genesis, is the fact that God told Adam that on the day he ate of the fruit he would die. Since Adam did not die on that day, we must either say that God lied or that there is another kind of death. Then there are Jesus' words "Let the dead bury their own dead", which would be impossible unless there are two meanings of dead here. Matthew 8:22 is also quite suggestive for it is too obvious that gaining the whole world is pointless if you die in the process, which is why many translations replace the word "life" with "soul" even though this is not supported by the original Greek. But if there is more than one kind of death (and thus more than one kind of life) then this makes perfect sense. Then there is Matthew 10:28, "And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both the body and soul in hell." In other words, all these passages suggests that in addition to physical death which is a natural part of life there is also a spiritual death - a death of the soul, which is such a more terrible thing than physical death, that God's warning in the Garden really does refer to the truth.In the next post I will continue the examination of this rather important chapter with the second answer to the problem of evil which JP discusses.

mitchellmckain · July 19, 2008

Where is the last post I made?Ah... I see there is a rather odd quirk in the system where post 11 was invisible because page 2 was not displayed until this post was made.

Edited July 19, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · July 19, 2008

The second answer that JP discusses is the denial of the reality of evil as a kind of deprivation of good in the same way that darkness is the lack of light. JP suggest that this idea loses much of its credibility in the face of things like the Holocaust and I quite agree. Saying that the problem doesn't exist has more of the flavor of pretending and delusion than of a rational solution. HOWEVER as JP mentions later in the chapter, the problem of evil and suffering is largely one of scale and what JP fails to notice is the fact that scale is something that alters with perspective. The child denied a piece of candy often acts like it is the end of the world, and similar changes of perspective happen throughout life. What then can we say from the perspective of eternal life in which God promises the realization of perfect justice and eternal happiness and which are difficult for us to even imagine.The third answer that JP discusses is the idea that evil and suffering are the neccessary price for some greater good that can be obtained in no other way. This is certainly an improvement on an older idea that evil is necessary for good, but there is still something troubling in JP's explanation, for although this may work for suffering or natural evil (such as the pain that is endured for the sake of great accomplishments like in ballet), we would not want to say that there is anything that could justify moral evil. But the solution to this is found in the connection that JP makes to the "free will defense". For then it is not evil itself that is justified but only the possibility of evil that is inherent in free will. I, in fact, believe that free will is the essence of life and so I claim that the possibility for evil is inherent in the idea of life itself. But in this case, is the creation of life really justified? I believe this depends entirely upon the motivation for doing it. Surely to create life just in order to bring this possibility for evil into fruition, is itself evil. On the other hand, to create life to care for and love, means that any suffering caused by this possibility for evil is empathetically shared by the creator, and thus I believe is morally justified when done for that motivation.However this is not explained by JP who simply suggests that there is a greater good that requires a two step process where God first creates at a distance to allow for free will but then allows us to abandon that free will by our own choice in order to experience heaven. But I find this solution of JPs to be quite attrocious, both for conceiving of a need for a Deist sort of God and for believing that an abandonment of the responsibility of free will (an abandonment of life itself in my view) is the nature of heaven. I think both of these are sterile and very short sighted. I see no reason to abandon the idea of God's involvement in our lives to the degree that JP does, for I think the logical problems are adequately addressed by simply limiting the nature of that involvement from a designing or controling role to that of a stimulating participant in the lives of His creatures as one part of their environment. Furthermore I believe that heaven is not found in an abandonment of life but by fully embracing it, but that life is only most fully engaged in a functional relationship with an infinite God. The illusion is not free will itself but our perception of it, like the imagination of child that the acceptance of rules is stifling their creativity, when the truth is that the structure that rules provide can actually liberate the hidden potential of our creativity. This truth is obvious in the arts but is also true in social interactions and in every other aspect of life.There are some other rather natural answers which JP does not discuss: that God lacks the power to prevent or stop evil, or that God is Himself a being of both good and evil. On can argue that these options are not seriously considered by Christian theologians, yet on the other hand there are elements in Christian thought that get very close to these and so I think indentifying them as such can help to show why they are wrong or at least distorted. Some versions of open theism make the future inaccessible to God, so that instead of being a choice to sacrifice absolute control, God is simply incapable preventing evil. The kenosis conception of God sacrificing power and knowledge for the sake of love is far richer and more inspiring. Much more common are attempts to justify apparently immoral behavior on the part of God by defending God's right to do as he pleases, which is a might makes right sort of philosophy that is morally vacuous and indefensible. This conception of God is closely associated with the intellectual blackmail approach to evangelism - believe or else, but putting God into the role of a gunman getting His way by waving a big gun around is a device suitable for religion as a means of manipulating people rather than bringing about spiritual awarenss and growth in a relationship with God. In conclusion I must say that JPs theodicy is greatly complicated by his idea of locating the hope of the Christian in some future act of God. In fact I think that this is a bandaid on a flawed theodicy. Furthermore, any formulation of Christianity which postpones its effectiveness to a future event makes it into a vacuous promise of a manipulative religion rather than a viable answer to life's challenges. This is why I think the immortality of the soul has always been the more universally accepted basis for religious thought, for then the issues of religion are immediate rather than promisory. There is only the need to understand this idea of the "immortality of the soul" properly by making the clear distinction between eternal existence and eternal life, knowing that it is having the second which makes the first an experience of heaven rather than hell.

Edited August 9, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · August 7, 2008

Chapter 9 Ethical Consideration One of the things that has become obvious as science has enabled us to do new things is the need for ethical guidance. We must observe that just because we can do a thing does not mean that we should. Science itself cannot answer such questions but although it would not be wise to simply hand such questions over to religion nevertheless ethics is something which religion has always studied and had a stake in. But although JP argues that science must accept that religion has something to contribute on these questions as a possible reservoir of ethical experience, JP also makes the excellent point that religion must also recognize that science brings about competely new ethical challenges that religion cannot ever have considered before. JP takes this to mean that these must be a matter of public dialogue. I would add that although religious principles may well play a role in the discussion, it is not productive to pretend that scriptures make a definitive stand on these issues.As an example JP considers the possibility of human cloning raised by the successful cloning of sheep. Because the high falure rate, negative health impacts, and potential for the manipulative invasion of human personhood, the use of cloning for actually producing human beings is plagued with ethical red flags. But the issue of theraputic cloning for stem cell research is quite a different matter. However, remembering Kant's injunction that human beings must always be an end and never a means to something, we are faced with the same question that is fundamental to the controversy over abortion: when does human life begin such that it should be protected by this ethical mandate laid down by Kant?Theology brings into this discussion questions about the spirit and soul. If the joining of the soul to the body happens at conception then the implication is that embryonic stem cell research should not be allowed. However JP points out a very interesting flaw in this point of view and this is the fact that the separation of the embryo into identical twins can occur up to 14 days after conception. JP also points to a older theological tradition by Thomas Aquinas (no doubt influenced by the opinion of Aristotle) that the soul becomes attached to the infant in the womb between 40 and 80 days after conception. However I think that JP's idea that dualist philosophy is somehow logically connected to the idea of human life begining at conception with the gift of the spirit is completely without foundation. I certainly do agree with JP that a developmental view of the human spirit is certainly more compatable with the scientific facts and the belief that human life begins somewhat later than conception, however I don't think that there is any necessary connection between the developmental view and JP's psychosomatic view. I hold to a developmental view that is a dual aspect monism like JP's view but which is much more highly dualistic than his psychosomatic view. I would argue that we can see very clear distinctions between the spirit, mind and body which makes JP's reduction of the spirit to some information bearing pattern of the body quite inadequate.In fact I think JP's view maintains the identification of humanity with genetics and biology which I think is seriously flawed philosophy. If genetics defines humanity and human value then this is not only more supportive of this idea of human life beginning at conception, but this is only one small step away from ideological justifications for racism, sexism and prejudice against the handicapped. Therefore I think our intuition or instinct to see our humanity as something quite apart genetics and biology -- which really amounts to no more than appearances, is well founded. Deviation from biological norms and differences in appearance do not subtract from our humanity, and likewise I submit that we can very well retain our superficial "human" appearance while losing everything that makes us human.Therefore since I see NO connection between our genetics and our humanity, I would find all these ethical concerns regarding the human genetic code to be a little misplaced. Our genome is certainly very important but all it really amounts to is a repository of information which is our heritage from our biological roots. I can very well see the ethical problems with tampering with that heritage in its abusive potential for a manipulative invasion of a person's life. However I see absolutely no reason to consider the human genetic code as sacred in any other context.

Edited September 8, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

mitchellmckain · August 19, 2008

Chapter 10 Imaginative PostscriptJP starts this chapter with an attempt to justify going beyond firmly based knowledge to use imaginative speculation in the investigation of theological truth comparing it to the use of thought experiements in physics. For me there is no need for such a justification, for more than JP's tentative endeavors I see this sort of speculative exploration as a central part of my own systematic methodology for discovering the truth. To do this requires adding a selective process so that you can plumb such a speculative explorations for something with actual truth value. This is done by matching the logical implications of such speculations to ones experience of reality and human existence. The reason for JP greater hesitation is probably found in the use that JP makes of his speculative exploration which is in the subject of eschatology. Since this is an opinion about future events this is not something can be pragmatically verified by anything but waiting to see. This can also explain, why I have not had much interest in the subject of eschatology at all.What is peculiar in JP's view (not to imply that others do not share it) is that it is to eschatology that they look for fulfillment of the Christian's hope after death. And so to pursue this with a speculative investigation, JP considers the question, "how are the old creation and the new creation related?" This is of particular interest to JP because it is directly related to JP's theology of there being two stages in God's creative work: first at a distance to allow for free will and then acheiving the ideal when we freely choose to abandon that free will. Since I cannot even look forward to the heaven He envisions as something of any promise at all, I cannot see any merit in his thinking. I do see a promise for the development of humanity in the historical context but not as something which all our hopes rest upon and not as the kind of physical transformation that JP envisions. Again I think that JP fails to think through all the implications of evolutionary theory and how it can bring new meaning to Christianity, for this gives us reason to see unfulfilled stages in the evoloutionary development of mankind as part of the natural course of human history which is quite apart and different from the natural stages in individual human life, which is where the hopes individual must be found. In any case, JP pursues his speculation based on the implications of New Testament scriptures that indicates that the kingdom of God is not something only in the future but something already begun with Christ's resurrection and concludes that this means that the old creation and the new are not simply sequential but also exists side by side. His speculation in this regard becomes extremely fantastic (not credible) when he envisions these as two subspaces within the multidimensional vector space of total created reality or as being located on separate branes of M-theory, which he thinks may intersect in our experience of the sacraments. I think that the answer to the question of how JP could be brought to such wild and incredulous ideas is found in the fact that he does not believe in a spiritual reality apart from the physical and this distort every aspect of his theology.This is brought into sharp focus with his question, "Did the risen Christ breathe?" He suggests that this represents and interchange of matter between these two intersecting worlds. I find it quite puzzling that JP ignores the words of 1 Corinthians 15, answering the question of "with what kind of bodies are we raised", with the words "spiritual body". I think the implication is quite simply that there is a spiritual aspect of reality including spiritual beings like God and the angels which are capable of interacting with the physical. JP's refusal to believe in a separate spiritual reality interacting with the physical explains why his views seem to me to fall somewhere between Panentheism or Deism, for it seems that he must be forced to conclude that either physical reality is a part of God or there is no way for God to interact with it.JP laments the way opposing theological positions that seem to dismiss scriptures talking of Jesus eating and touching or the stories of the empty tomb which he sees as implying this interchange between two worlds and denying the critical significance of Jesus resurrection. But the other ways is to see Jesus' resurrection is as an affirmation of the tangible reality of the spiritual and with it the undeniable reality of the subjective aspect of our experiences. The point is that although the experiences of the risen Jesus may have been fully spiritual and subjective, this does not mean that they were not absolutely real. The undeniable significance of the resurrection can be found in the fact that the spiritual IS REAL, just as God who is spirit IS REAL, no matter how subjective our experience of Him may be. I think calling this point of view "dismissive" is just plain prejudicial. To show just how non-dismissive this can be, I ask you to consider my metaphysical position that spiritual things are composed of energy just as are physical things, but that these are simply a very different form of energy and is not a part of the space-time plus (11 dimensions in all) structure of the physical universe, and more importantly not subject to the laws of physics which is the basis of objective experiences.

Edited September 8, 2008 by mitchellmckain (see edit history)

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John Polkinghorne's, "exploring Reality" commentary on his views of science and religion

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