webishqiptar 0 Report post Posted November 27, 2009 One of the most puzzling structural features of commonsense morality is the presence of asymmetrical constraints on harming and allowing harm or for short, just asymmetrical constraints. By that it means that the constraints on harming are strong and that the constraints on allowing harm are weak. Very roughly, commonsense morality says that it is typically impermissible for an agent to harm someone else even if the agent would thereby prevent herself or a bystander from suffering a greater harm. But commonsense morality also says that it is typically permissible for an agent to allow someone else to suffer an harm even if the agent thereby only avoids herself or a bystander suffering a smaller harm. This feature of commonsense morality has come under a tremendous amount of criticism, and some of the most powerful writing in moral theory has concluded that asymmetrical constrains are defensible, and defensible, moreover on grounds that their critics could accept. Common ground The first ground critics could accept is the idea, to put it very roughly, that the claim that such a orality is correct must ultimately be based on some kind of appeal to what makes people's live go best. This idea is, we believe what makes the attractiveness of utilitarianism so enduring. Never mind its distributive insensitivity and it's traditional gloss on what makes poeple's live go best. The idea that the correct morality in some way or other best serves our interests is plausible. It is also what makes asymmetrical constrains so puzzling.If the cost the agent avoided is the, and the harm vistim suffered is the same, and so on what does it matter whether the agent harmed the victim or merely allowed the victim to suffer the harm? No one puts it this crudely, but this is surely what lies at the heart of the puzzle. Share this post Link to post Share on other sites